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Juho Wilskman
The ConfliCT BeTWeen The angevins and The ByzanTines in morea 
in 1267-1289: a laTe ByzanTine endemiC War1
A common dictum in modern research is that, in medieval warfare, pitched 
battles were unusual and instead the armies concentrated on ravaging 
enemy territories. Especially the Byzantines are traditionally believed to 
have been inclined to avoid open battles2. As a result, medieval wars are 
1. This article is largely based on my MA thesis “Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhti­
naskunnan väliset sotatoimet 1259­83: Tapaustutkimus myöhäis­bysanttilaisesta sodankäyn­
nistä” (The War between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia 1259-83: A Case 
Study in Late Byzantine Warfare) for the University of Helsinki (2007). The thesis in Finnish 
is published on the Internet with an English abstract at the address http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-
fe20072054. I have, however, made several revisions, especially thanks to the scholarships 
for my PhD work, which enabled me to stay for several months in Athens and Rome, and 
study such material that is poorly accessible in Scandinavia. Other articles based on my MA 
thesis are: J. Wilskman, The Campaign and Battle of Pelagonia 1259, Βυζαντινός Δόμος 
17-18 (2009-2010), 131-174 and id.,A conflict (and some co-habitation) in Crusader Greece 
– Morea 1264 and the Battle of Makry-Plagi, which is intended to be a part of forthcoming 
monograph by Central European University about the Crusades, and the battle of Prinitsa 
in 1263, which is planned to be published in BZ. I wish thank Jon van Leuven, Marina 
Koumanoudi, and Stephen Bennett for comments and correcting my English. All the errors 
are my own.
2. See for example J. gillingham, “Up with Orthodoxy!”; In Defence of Vegetian 
Warfare, Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004), 149–158; J. franCe, Western Warfare 
in the Age of the Crusades 1000­1300, London 1999, 2-15; s. morillo, Battle Seeking: The 
Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy, Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 
21-29; m. BarTusis, The Late Byzantine Army, Arms and Society. 1204–1453, Philadelphia 
1992, 354-357; J. haldon, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World. 565­1204, 
London 1999, 35–36, 278. It has been suggested (for example by Haldon and Bartusis) that 
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often considered to have been fought at a low level. Notwithstanding this 
“current orthodoxy”, actual research has concentrated on “big events”. This 
is understandable, because low-level warfare seldom leaves many traces in 
the sources. 
In this article I attempt to reconstruct one medieval and late Byzantine 
low-level war, namely the conflict between the Angevins and their vassal, 
the Principality of Achaia, on the one side and the Byzantines on the other, 
in the Morea during 1267-1289. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-
documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Several modern historians have 
treated the events3, but analysis from the point of view of military history 
has been missing. In addition I give special attention to the economic and 
demographic consequences of war in Morea, for the building of fortresses, 
and for the idea put forward by Bartusis that war in Morea needlessly took 
resources from the defense of Anatolia, thus contributing to the loss of the 
a lack of resources was the reason to avoid battles. I have however shown that this idea is 
problematical (Wilskman, Pelagonia, 146-147, 162).
3. The most comprehensive ones about events in Morea during the period under discussion 
are a. Bon, La Morée franque: Recherches historiques, topographiques et archeologiques 
sur la principauté d’Achaïe (1205–1430), Paris 1969, 136-66; d. zakyThinos, Le Despotat 
Grec de Morée, rev.ed. Ch. malTézou, London 21975, 48-62; K. hopf, Griechenland. B. 
Griechenland im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit: Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des 
Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit, in Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste 
in alphabetischer Folge [Erste Section 85 Teil], Leipzig 1867, 261-264, 290-329; J. longnon, 
L’Empire Latin du Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, Paris 1949, 234-267 passim; 
W. miller, The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece. 1204–1566, London 
1908, 125-175 passim; f. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine, 
Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane 41 (nuova serie 2) (1916) and 42 (nuova serie 
3) (1917); p. loCk, The Franks in the Aegean. 1204–1500, London-New York 1995, 84-95; 
a. mpouTsikas, Η Φραγκοκρατία στην Ηλεία (1205-1428). Η κυριαρχία των ξένων και η 
πολιτική τους, Athens 1985, 77-100; m. dourou-eliopoulou, Η ανδεγαυική κυριαρχία στη 
Ρωμανία επί Καρόλου Α΄ (1266-1285), Athens 1987, 55-58, 79-88, 170-188 passim; ead., 
Το φραγκικό πριγκιπάτο της Αχαΐας (1204–1432), Thessaloniki 2005, 35-37. Recently 
two new studies about late Byzantine warfare have emerged. Both, however, treat the events 
in Morea 1267-1289 only cursory and concentrating on the campaigns of 1270 and 1272 [s. 
kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium. 1204­1453 [History of Warfare 67], Leiden 2011, 
203; n. kanellopoulos, Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού στην ύστερη 
περίοδο (1204-1461), unpublished PhD thesis for the University of Thessaly, Volos 2010, 
101-102. I thank kanellopoulos for giving me access to this study].
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area to the Turks4. Especially older studies have been ready to claim that 
the war caused significant depopulation in the peninsula, but some modern 
ones are more doubtful and have declared that mainly the geographical 
distribution of the population changed5. There is plenty of literature about 
the castles of the Peloponnese, which are usually considered to have been 
built mainly by the Latins of the principality. However, the claim of the 
Venetian historian Marino Sanudo that during the war the Byzantines built 
“strong castles over the mountains and made most fortified passes”6 has been 
left almost unnoticed. I also give attention to the treatment of prisoners.
The Background
The conflict between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia 
had began in 1259, when the Prince of Achaia supported his father-in-
law, Michael II of Epeiros, against the “Emperor of Nicaea” Michael VIII 
Palaiologos. The coalition was defeated in the battle of Pelagonia, and 
Guillaume II, the Prince of Achaia, fell into the hands of the Nicaeans with 
most of his nobles. Prince Guillaume made peace after the “Nicaeans” had 
conquered Constantinople and “re-founded” Byzantium in 1261. In exchange 
for freedom Prince Guillaume gave the Byzantines fortified places in south-
east Morea7. 
4. BarTusis, The Late Byzantine Army, 347-350.
5. For the traditional point of view, see for example zakyThinos, Le Despotat Grec de 
Morée, 44, 48–51; loCk, The Franks in the Aegean, 84; d. geanakoplos, Emperor Michael 
Palaeologus and the West. 1258–1282: A Study in Byzantine­Latin Relations, Cambridge 
Massachusetts 1959, 175; miller, A History of Frankish Greece, 119, 125. For the more 
modern ones e. sakellariou, Latin Morea in the Late Middle Ages: Observations on its 
Demography and Economy, in Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of 
Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, ed. Ch. dendrinos 
et al., Aldershot 2003, 301–308; B. panagioTopoulos, Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της 
Πελοποννήσου. 13ος - 18ος αιώνας, Athens 1985, 27–44.
6. “Fece castelli forti sopra montagne e passi fortissimi” (Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο. 
Ιστορία της Ρωμανίας [Institute for Byzantine Research, Sources 4], introduction, edition-
translation, commentary by E. papadopoulou, Athens 2000, 125. 15). 
7. For the campaign of Pelagonia, see especially Wilskman, Pelagonia, and D. 
geanakoplos, Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of 
Pelagonia, DOP 7 (1953), 99-141. In addition there is s. asoniTes, Πελαγονία 1259: Μια νέα 
θεώρηση, Βυζαντιακά 11 (1991), 129-165.
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The peace did not last long and the war broke out almost as soon as 
Prince Guillaume and his men had returned to Morea. Things began well for 
the Byzantines and Prince Guillaume had problems in getting support from 
his vassals outside Morea8. The men of the Principality, however, defeated 
the Byzantines in the battle of Prinitsa (most likely in late autumn 1263). 
In the next year, after an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the “capital” of 
the Principality, Andravida, the Turkish mercenaries in Byzantine service 
went over to the Latins, because they had not received their pay for several 
months and had served longer than intended. Together the Franks and 
the Turks defeated the Byzantines at the battle of Makry-Plagi and took a 
number of prisoners, but soon after the battle the Turks returned home to 
Anatolia. Prince Guillaume apparently felt unable to push the Byzantines 
out of Morea himself. This led to the end of the intensive phase of the war 
in Morea9.
At this point there seem to have been serious peace efforts. A prisoner 
exchange took place, and according to Sanudo, the Byzantines suggested 
that the son of Emperor Michael should marry the daughter of Prince 
Guillaume. The prince had no sons and thus after his death his territories 
would fall under the control of the Palaiologos dynasty. The Frankish barons 
8. Prince Guillaume was also the overlord of the Lord of Athens, the marquis of 
Boudonitza, the triarchs of Euboea, the duke of Naxos and the count of kephalenia (Livre de 
la conqueste de la princée de l’Amorée. Chronique de Morée (1204­1305), ed. J. longnon, 
Paris 1911, §§ 221–253; The Chronicle of Morea (Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως): A History 
in Political Verse Relating the Establishment of Feudalism in Greece by the Franks in the 
Thirteenth Century, edited by J. sChmiTT, London 1904 (English translation h. lurier, 
Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of Morea, New York 1964), 3173–3364; Libro de 
los Fechos e conquistas del principado de la Morea, compilado por comandamiento de don 
Fray Johan Fernández de Heredia. Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles, ed. a. 
morel-faTio, Genève 1885, §§ 236–240; G. reCoura (ed.), Les Assises de Romanie, Paris 
1930, III; C. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò dal 2 gennaio 1274 al 31 dicembre 
1283, Archivio Storico Italiano serie 3 XXII – serie 4 V (1875–1880), 26 August 1278; 
Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, [as in n. 6],103–105, 109–113, 125).
9. Closer analyses of events, sources and previous scholarship can be found in my 
forthcoming articles about the battles of Makry-Plagi and Prinitsa. For the earlier wars of the 
Principality of Achaia, see especially m. kordoses, Η κατάκτηση της νότιας Ελλάδας από 
τους Φράγκους. Ιστορικά και τοπογραφικά προβλήματα, Ιστορικογεωγραφικά 1 (1986), 
53-194.
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of Morea refused to accept the settlement10. Prince Guillaume together with 
his overlord, the expelled Latin emperor of Constantinople Baldwin II, now 
sought support from Charles of Anjou, the count of Provence and brother 
of king Louis IX of France. Charles, who was crowned king of Sicily, was 
the leading figure of the supporters of the Pope in Italy (the guelphs) and 
had conquered southern Italy from Manfred, the natural son of Emperor 
Frederick II. 
At Viterbo in 1267, Charles made treaties with the Latins of Romania. 
In exchange for support in re-conquering Constantinople, Baldwin gave 
Charles the overlordship of several territories in Romania, including the 
Principality of Achaia. On his part Prince Guillaume gave his daughter to 
the son of Charles of Anjou, thus the Angevin dynasty would also inherit the 
direct control of the Principality. The heritage would belong to the Angevins 
even if the son of Charles were to die before his father, as it happened. 
For the next fifteen years after the treaty, until the Sicilian Vespers, the 
diplomacy in the Mediterranean region was largely dictated by Charles’ 
attempts to organize a large scale campaign against the Byzantines, and by 
Michael VIII’s efforts to prevent it. Morea was only one front in the conflict 
between these two rulers11.
The most important archive documents dealing with the events under 
discussion were the Angevin registers in Napoli, which were destroyed by the 
Germans in 1943. The content of the registers has been partly reconstructed 
under the leadership of Ricardo Filangieri and his followers in I Registri 
della Cancelleria Angioina from the old editions, microfilms, and some 
surviving pieces. From the point of view of the events in Morea the most 
10. Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 129; Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, 
III.17, ed. A. failler [CFHB v. XXIV/1], Paris 1984.
11. For the treaty of Viterbo see C. perraT – J. longnon (eds.), Actes Relatifs à la 
Principauté de Morée, Paris 1967, Appendice, 1267, 24 Mai – Viterbe; J. BuChon, Recherches 
et matériaux pour servir a une histoire de la domination française aux XIIIe, XIVe et XVe 
siècles dans les provinces démembrées de l’empire Grec a la suite de la quatrième croisade, 
Paris 1840, registre du trésor des chartes no. 49, 232; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 6265–6492; 
Livre de la conqueste, §§ 441–56. For the political struggle between Michael Palaiologos and 
Charles I Anjou the classic is: geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 
1258–1282. See also G. L. Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò e il Mediterraneo. Politica, diplomazia 
e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri [Collection de l’École Française de Rome 411], 
Rome 2008.
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important sources about the content of the registers are the two-part article 
“La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle insole vicine” by Fr. Cerone and 
C. Minieri-Riccio’s “Il Regno di Carlo I.° D’Ang iò dal 2. Gennaio 1273 al 31 
dicembre 1283”. Cerone’s article is a study which includes several long direct 
quotations from the registers; Minieri-Riccio’s work consists of regesta; and 
the Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée of Perrat and Longnon begin 
only at the end of the war discussed here. karl Hopf’s classic study should 
also be mentioned here, since it used several documents from the archives of 
Anjou, which disappeared before other researchers could study them12.
A very important source is the list of the Venetian claims commission of 
the year 1278 on cases where the Byzantines had broken the truce they made 
with Venice in 1268. This list names 257 separate incidents (339 claims), 
mainly “piratical” actions. Several of them have something to do with the war 
in Morea13. In addition, the notarial documents from Dubrovnik (Ragusa) 
offer some interesting information.
The most important narrative source is the Chronicle of Morea. It 
was apparently written in the 1320s and has survived in several versions 
12. Because Filangieri’s work is a reconstruction, I quote it only when the original 
edition has not been at my disposal. If Cerone’s article has an edition of the quoted part of 
document, I consider this edition as a primary source and give the archival note. Otherwise I 
treat Cerone as a secondary source. Hopf’s study does not include editions. For the analysis of 
the Angevin archives from the point of view of the Principality of Achaia, see f. sampsonis, 
L’administration de la Morée par Charles Ier d’Anjou (1267-1285). L’apport majeur d’une 
source delicate: les registres angevins, Mélanges de l’École française de Rome: Moyen 
Âge 120, 1 (2008), 140-145. See also the studies of M. dourou-eliopoulou, Η ανδεγαυική 
κυριαρχία, 34-36, 56-58, 79-88; ead., Les “Etrangers latins” en Romanie angevine sous 
Charles Ier (1266-85), BSl 59 (1998), 65-70; ead., The Oriental Policy of Charles I and 
Angevin Settlement in Romania. A Model of Medieval Colonialism, Βυζαντινά 21 (2000), 
279-286.
13. Tafel – Thomas, v. 3, 159-281 no. CCCLXX. For commentary on this document 
see g. morgan, The Venetian Claims Commission of 1278, BZ 69 (1976), 411-438. For 
piracy of the time in general see p. Charanis, Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of 
Michael VIII Paleologus, AlPHOS 10 (1950), 127–136; i. kaTele, Captains and Corsairs: 
Venice and Piracy. 1261 – 1381, PhD Thesis for the University of Illinois, Urbana 1986, 
2–131; e. papadopoulou, Πειρατές και κουρσάροι στο Αιγαίο τον 13ο αιώνα, Δίπτυχα 6 
(1994-1995), 89-107. For piracy in Angevin sources, see M. dourou-eliopoulou, Η πειρατεία 
στις ανδεγαυικές κτήσεις της Ρωμανίας το δεύτερο μισό του 13ου αι., in Πειρατές και 
κουρσάροι: Μονεμβασιώτικος Όμιλος, Ιʹ συμπόσιο ιστορία και τέχνης, 20-22 Ιουλίου 
1997, eds. Ch. kalligas – a. malliaris, Athens 2004, 56-65.
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in various different languages. The French and vernacular Greek versions 
are closest to the original Chronicle. The Aragonese Libro de los Fechos 
et conquistas del Principado de la Morea was written at the end of the 
fourteenth century and is considered as an independent work that has 
used the Chronicle of Morea as its main source14. I quote both the Greek 
Chronicle of Morea and the French Livre de la conqueste, if both works 
provide the information in question, and the Libro de los Fechos, when its 
version of the events differs from the other two.
The Chronicle of Morea, regardless of the version, is a very problematic 
source. Often the information that the Chronicle gives is simply false and 
the work is far from being impartial. Some mistakes may result from the 
fact that the Chronicle of Morea probably relied heavily on oral sources, 
whose information easily becomes distorted. The author’s familiarity with 
the topography of the Peloponnese suggests that the information he gives 
about the events in the peninsula might be more reliable than his reports 
about the events outside the region. Besides, the Chronicle pays attention 
to military matters, more than, for example, the aforementioned Sanudo, 
who wrote at about the same time and is often considered more reliable. A 
major problem is that the chronology of the events in Chronicle does not 
quite agree with that deducted from the other sources15. Unfortunately the 
Constantinople-centered Byzantine historians do not have anything to say 
about this phase of the war in Morea.
Historians should also try to use the non-written sources. Among 
these, the remnants of the fortifications and the archaeological field surveys 
have particular importance from the point of view of my study. The main 
method of these surveys is to collect ceramics from a relatively large area 
and reconstruct the settlement history. Unfortunately the chronology of 
late medieval ceramics in Greece is still quite inexact. With the research 
on the fortifications, the major problem is that there were usually no 
great differences in masonry between the different fortification builders 
14. Several studies have been written about the Chronicle of Morea, but the current 
knowledge and debates are fairly well summarized in the monograph by T. shaWCross, The 
Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece, Oxford 2009.
15. Bon, La Morée franque, 29–30, 140-144; geanakoplos, The Battle of Pelagonia, 
130–131. About Sanudo see E. papadopoulou, Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο. Ιστορία της 
Ρωμανίας [as in n. 6 above], 3–17, 53–95; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 204–205.
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in Romania, and several sites have also been used as fortresses before and 
after medieval times. Therefore it is difficult to define the exact builder or 
building period simply from the remnants. Even the textual references can 
be misleading. Perhaps archaeological investigations will shed more light in 
the future, but so far relatively few medieval fortification sites in Morea have 
been excavated16.
The War
The Peloponnese peninsula has five major coastal plains. The plain 
of Achaia in the north-west was the core area of the principality. Here 
were located Andravida, the capital of the principality, and its harbor town 
Clarenza. The Byzantines practically ruled the south-eastern part of the 
peninsula and the plain of Lakonia, which is located there. Apparently in 
1264 the Latins controlled here only the town of Lakedaimon (Sparta), which 
had to be repopulated by Prince Guillaume because the Greek inhabitants 
had fled and moved to Mistra17.  
The interior of the Peloponnese peninsula is mountainous, but there 
are numerous valleys and plains. Along the Alpheios River these form 
a na tural corridor through the Peninsula, from the plain of Achaia to the 
plain of Lakonia. The highest mountains are found in the Taygetos range 
between Lakonia and the south-western plain of Messenia. Autonomous and 
apparently warlike Slavs, who were allied with the Byzantines, lived in these 
mountains. Apart from the Slavs, another distinctive ethnic group were the 
Tsakones, who lived in the mountainous south-eastern tip of the Pe ninsula. 
Although the Tsakones spoke Greek, because of their peculiar dialect and 
customs, they were frequently considered as a separate ethnic group18.
16. For the difficulties in dating fortifications, see for example k. molin, Unknown 
Crusader Castles, Hambledon and London 2001, 203-204, 222-223; m. BreuilloT, Châteaux 
Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale, Paris 2005, 261-263; Bon, La Morée franque, 645-646, 
680-684.
17. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 5584-5635; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 385-9. I treat these 
events further in my forthcoming article about the battle of Makry-Plagi.
18. For the historical geography of thirteenth century Peloponnese, in general, see 
a. ilieva, The mountain in the geographical and cultural space of the Peloponnese during 
the Middle Ages (before the Tourkokratia), Ιστορικογεωγραφικά 3 (1991), 11-24. The 
monograph of a. ilieva, Frankish Morea (1205­1262). Socio­cultural interaction between 
the Franks and the local populations [Historical Monographs 9], Athens 1991, provides a 
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In addition the Byzantines plausibly controlled the Mani peninsula also 
west of the Taygetos range and south of Kalamata. The castle of Kalavryta 
in the northern Peloponnese c. 100 km away from the rest of the Byzantine 
territories might also have been in their hands. The Byzantines possessed 
these places in the 1270s, and we do not have concrete information about the 
date they were taken over. I have argued, however, that kalavryta would have 
been captured in 1263 and I believe that about the same time the Byzantines 
also occupied the west side of the Mani peninsula19.
The Chronicle of Morea claims that, when Prince Guillaume was still 
in Italy making treaties with Charles, a Byzantine army commanded by 
the nephew of the Emperor came to Morea. His troops were composed of 
Cumans, Turks, and Greeks from the region of Nicaea. According to the 
Chronicle the Prince went immediately to Brindisi and sailed from there to 
Clarentza in two days. In Andravida he started to organize the defense and 
supply of the castles. The Chronicle claims that king Charles sent Galeran 
d’Ivry to help the Prince and describes the campaign which followed. Most 
scholars believe, however, that the Chronicle has confused Galeran d’Ivry 
and his campaign with one that Dreux de Beaumont carried out with the 
Prince in 1272. The nephew of the emperor would have arrived in 1270. 
In earlier research he is identified with Alexios Philanthropenos, who had 
apparently commanded the Byzantine navy on the coast of the Peninsula in 
1262-320.
useful introduction to the society and culture of the Principality of Achaia. On the Tsakones, 
see s. CaraTzas, Les Tzacones, New York 1976.
19. More detailed commentary about the Byzantine conquests during the early phase 
of the war is in my forthcoming article about the battle of Prinitsa. For indications about the 
Byzantine holding of kalavryta and several places west of Taygetos in the 1270s, see Tafel – 
Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [A]38, 53, [H]16, 17, 19, [J]7; Catalogue A. Dedicatory Inscriptions, 
in Dedicatory Inscriptions and Donor Portraits in Thirteenth­Century Churches of Greece, 
ed. s. kalopissi-verTi [VTIB, Bd. 5], Wien 1992, 66-67, 71-75; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 
662-92. See also J. van leuven, The Phantom Baronies of the Western Mani, in Studies in the 
Archaeology of the Medieval Mediterranean, ed. J. sChryver [The Medieval Mediterranean 
86], Leiden 2010, 45-67.
20. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 6484–6771; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 456-473; Cerone, 
La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 18 (reg. v. 4, f. 39 t.); I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, 
eds. R. filangieri – J. mazzoleni – J. donsì genTile – R. orefiCe de angelis – B. mazzoleni 
– S. palmieri – M. L. sTorChi, v. I-XXX, XXXVIII, XLIV, Napoli 1950-1998, v. I, no. II, 157; 
hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 292-293; Bon, La Morée franque, 140-2. About Alexios 
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Anyway, in 1268 Charles was attacked by Conradin von Hohenstaufen. 
Prince Guillaume made a one-year truce with the Emperor’s kephale, i.e. 
representative or governor in Morea, and he went to help Charles with 400 
heavy cavalrymen. A papal document attests him in Italy in March 1268. 
In August, Charles achieved his great victory over Conradin in the battle of 
Tagliacozzo. According to the Chronicle of Morea Guillaume heard soon 
after the battle that the Byzantines had broken the treaty and attacked. 
He returned to the Peloponnese and king Charles gave with him 50 heavy 
cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen. According to the Greek version of the 
Chronicle the latter were crossbowmen, and Charles also gave money for six 
months’ wages21.
Most of the researchers believe that Guillaume returned to his 
Principality not earlier than February or March 1269 and thus the idea that 
the Byzantines had broken the truce is only propaganda22. In my opinion it 
might also be worth taking into account the possibility that the Byzantine 
kephale had made the truce only on his own behalf and now a new kephale, 
who did not recognize the truce, had arrived in the autumn. During the 
peace negotiations in 1289 the kephale directly informed the Latins that 
he could make a truce only for one year, because his period in office was 
Philanthropenos on the coast of the Peloponnese see Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, 
ΙΙΙ.15–16. 
21. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 6772-7165; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 474-93; Registres 
de Clement IV (1265­1268) recueil des bulles de ce Pape, ed. m. édouard Jordan, Paris 
1894, no. 1336; s. Borsari, La Politica bizantina di Carlo I d’Angiò dal 1266 al 1271, Archivio 
Storico per le Provincie Napoletane, nuova serie 35 (74 dell’ intera collezione), (1956), 
341-342. The Aragonese Libro de los Fechos differs in details from the other versions of the 
Chronicle concerning the battle of Tagliacozzo (Libro de los Fechos, §§ 400–14). See also 
n. kanellopoulos – i. lekea, Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική εναντίον των Φράγκων κατά 
τον 13ο αιώνα και η μάχη του Tagliacozzo, ByzSym 19 (2009), 63-81; g. villani, Nuova 
Cronica, ed. g. porTa, v. 1 (libri I-VIII), Parma 1990, § VIII, XXIII-VIII, XXIX. Joachim 
Göbbels has concluded in his studies that in the army of Charles I the cavalrymen were 
divided into units of 25 men and the infantry into units of 50 men [J. göBBels, Militärwesen 
im Königreich Sizilien zur Zeit Karls I. Anjou (1265–1285), Stuttgart 1984, 82–83]. These 
numbers correspond neatly with figures that the Chronicle gives about the contingents sent 
by the king.
22. hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 290; Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 
36; zakyThinos, Le Despotat Grec de Morée, 47-48; Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 22-23.
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not longer23. The short terms of office would have made it difficult for the 
Byzantines to follow a coherent strategy in the Peninsula, but the Emperor 
might have wanted to avoid a situation where a Byzantine aristocrat would 
have gained a powerful position in a province distant from Constantinople. 
The Angevin registers indicate that something was indeed going on 
in Morea. In 1269 Charles ordered his captain in kerkyra to obey Prince 
Guillaume.  There are also several orders relating transports of victuals 
to Morea from southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1269. In 1270 
Charles ordered that a navy of 25 galleys and terides, and some vaccettas24, 
should be prepared for Morea. Among other things it would have transported 
hundreds of horses. From the same year we also have several references, 
which reveal that fief holders in southern Italy were required to fulfill their 
service obligation by participating the campaign in Morea. For some reasons 
the preparation of the navy met serious difficulties, and the ships were still 
in harbor in the late autumn. Angevin naval resources were apparently 
over-extended, because of the Crusade against Tunis. Probably this navy to 
Achaia never sailed forth25. 
23. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8687–8706; Livre de la conqueste, § 599; zakyThinos, 
Le Despotat Grec de Morée, 63-65. It should be noted Bartusis has claimed that this may have 
been simply a ploy of the governor, if he for some reason hesitated to make a peace (BarTusis, 
The Late Byzantine Army, 70-72).
24. Galleys were powered both by sails and oars. A typical galley of Charles I of Anjou 
in the 1270s had 108 oars, each with its own rower. There were 27 benches on each side of 
the galley and two rowers on each bench. The full crew of this kind of galley was normally 
about 150 men and included about 35 supersalientes (more or less equivalent to marines, 
most likely they were crossbowmen). The teride was a galley specially designed for horse-
transportation; the terides built for Charles I Anjou could for example transport 30 horses. 
The vaccetta was more or less a large boat [I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XII, nos. 
LXVI, 11, 12; no. LXVII, 292; no. LXIII, 486; J. pryor, The Galleys of Charles I of Anjou, 
king of Sicily: ca. 1269-84, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 14 (Old Series, 
Volume 24) (1993), 33-103; göBBels, Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien, 251-254].
25. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 29–38 (reg. 3, f. 1; reg. 3, f. 3; reg  4, f. 
16), 50–62 (reg. 11, f. 7; reg. 11, f. 1 t; reg 5, f. 80; reg. 5, f. 94; reg. 6, f. 164 t.; reg., 6, f. 133; 
reg. 11, f. 80 et); I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. I, no. V, 320; v. II, nos. VIII, 334, 
622; v. IV, nos. XIV, 51, 135, 222, 229, 304, 316, 377, 385, 398, 405, 423, 432, 441, 447; 
v. IV, exravagantes infra regnum nos. XIV, 1029, 1030; v. V, no. XVII, 32;  v. V, nos. XV, 
111, 290, 353, 387; v. VI, no. XXII, 949; v. VII, no. XXVII, 74; no. XXXI, 65; v. IX, no. 
XLII, 58; v. XLIV, additiones reg. no. XX, 29; W. Cohn, Storia della flotta siciliana sotto 
il governo di Carlo I d’Angiò, Archivio storico per la Sicilia Orientale, seconda serie, anno 
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Additional evidence about the military activity in Morea is found in 
the Venetian claims document from 1278, according to which Byzantine 
soldiers robbed and killed Latin churchmen, who were heading from Methone 
to Clarenza. The event probably took place in 1270. The commander of the 
Byzantines is referred to as σεβαστοκράτωρ. He is also mentioned elsewhere, 
in connection with several other “robberies” in Morea, as Emperor’s 
brother26. Apparently it refers to Constantine Palaiologos, the step-brother 
of the Emperor, who had commanded the Byzantines early in the war, but 
left before the defeat at Makry-Plagi27. I also believe that he could be the 
“nephew” of the emperor, who according to the Chronicle arrived with the 
army of Cumans, Turks, and Greeks from the region of Nicaea.
It has been suggested that the Byzantines exploited the Crusade 
campaign of Charles and his brother to Tunis in 1270, which ended with 
the destruction of a large part of the fleet in a storm28. It is, however, worth 
noting that the destination of the Crusader fleet was kept secret until the last 
moment, and there were fears that it would sail against the Byzantines29. It 
would have been impossible for the Byzantines to make a plan of exploiting 
the Crusade for expansion in Morea. At most they might have planned a 
diversionary attack in case the Crusaders headed towards Constantinople 
or, as seems most likely, the Byzantine commander simply exploited the 
V; 25 dell’intera collezione (1929), 366-381, 386-387; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 
290-292; zakyThinos, Le Despotat Grec de Morée, 48-50; Bon, La Morée franque, 138-41; 
Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 24-29, 51-55; J. pryor, Soldiers of Fortune in the Fleets of Charles 
I of Anjou, king of Sicily ca 1265-1285, in Mercenaries and Paid men. The Mercenary 
Identity in the Middle Ages, ed. J. franCe [History of Warfare 47], Leiden 2008, 126-128; 
geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 222-223.
26. Tafel – Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [A] 28, [H] 14, 17, [L] 12–13. Σεβαστοκράτωρ 
was title in the imperial hierarchy immediately after the emperor and δεσπότης (pseudo-
kodinos, Traité des offices, introduction, texte et traduction par J. verpeaux, Paris 1967, 
300). The Venetian claims document refers to the alleged victims of the incidents as “robbed” 
(derobato). Thus I mostly refer the incidents as “robberies” unless the context allows more 
specific judgment about the nature of the event.
27. Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, ΙΙΙ.16-17. See also my forthcoming article 
about the battle of Makry-Plagi. 
28. geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 227-230.
29. Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 55-71; Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, V.8-10; J. 
sTrayer, The Crusades of Louis IX, in A History of the Crusades, vol. II: Later Crusades 
(1189–1311), eds. r. e. Wolf – h. W. hazard, Philadelphia 1962, 509-516.
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situation when he found out that there were less enemy troops in the 
peninsula than expected.
Anyway, the Byzantine attacks might have been quite successful. The 
route from Methone to Clarenza was some distance away. Lakedaimon 
perhaps fell to the Byzantines at this time; at least the description of the 
campaign of Prince Guillaume and Dreux de Beaumont/Galeran d’Ivry 
(see below) seems to indicate that the Franks had lost all their territories 
in Lakonia. It is also possible that some of the fortifications which were 
found in Byzantine hands in 1270s, such as Beaufort and kalavryta, were 
not conquered in 1262-4, but later, and in that case the campaign of the 
σεβαστοκράτωρ would be another good alternative30.
At least in 1271 Byzantine vessels were already active in the Ionian 
Sea. On 7 July, a ship which had come from Monemvasia in south-eastern 
Morea, robbed a Venetian, who was traveling from Lepanto (Naupaktos) 
to Clarenza. This Byzantine ship was apparently an imperial corsair, 
its captain’s name was “Zuraz” and the nauclearius was “Rolandinus”31. 
The Venetian claim document of 1278 applies relatively seldom the term 
cursarius (it usually refers simply homines domini Imperatoris). I, however, 
find the term corsair proper for “Zuraz” and similar captains, who prayed 
on merchant fleets without being a part of a major fleet, but, at least judging 
from the Venetian claim document, were under the authority of the Emperor 
and thus cannot be considered as out-law pirates32.
On 12 January 1272 the harbor of Nauplion was attacked by a fleet of 
17 imperial galleys and five other vessels commanded by “Caleoiani Apriano 
prothouestiaria”. The Venetians claimed that they had lost property worth 
30. A terminus ante quem for the loss of Lakedaimon is August 1278; Les registres 
de Nicolas III (1277­1293) [BEFAR 2é serie t. 14], ed. J. gay, Paris 1898, no. 123; Bon, 
La Morée franque, 144-145. The Venetian claims document, which is the first source about 
Beaufort in the hands of the Byzantines, refers to the σεβαστοκράτωρ, Tafel – Thomas, no. 
CCCLXX [H]17.
31. Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [L]4. Morgan identifies Zuraz with Gyrakis, who is 
mentioned in connection with some other “robberies” and had his base in the eastern part 
of the Aegean Sea (morgan, The Venetian Claims Commission, 428-429). At the time the 
term nauclearius was roughly equivalent to “helmsman” (pryor, The Galleys of Charles I of 
Anjou, 81-83).
32. For the definitions of pirates and corsairs see especially kaTele, Captains and 
Corsairs, 2-37, 47-56; papadopoulou, Πειρατές και κουρσάροι, 89-90, 96-100, 106-7.
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4000 hyperpyra33. It was probably a surprise attack which took advantage 
of the unlikely sailing season34. The risk seems to have been worth taking, at 
least if plunder was the only aim.
In February 1272 an Angevin army commanded by the marshal Dreux 
de Beaumont finally reached Clarenza. Apparently there were already some 
fief holders from southern Italy serving in the region. This campaign is 
usually identified with the campaign of Galeran d’Ivry described in the 
Chronicle of Morea35. According to the Chronicle, d’Ivry had 100 paid 
cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen –half of the later being crossbowmen and 
the other half shield-bearers. In addition to this,  the king had promised to 
cover the expeditionary corps’ wages for six months. The Prince was in the 
upper Alpheios valley, but he travelled immediately to d’Ivry and brought 
pack-animals to his troops. It was decided to travel to the town of Nikli in 
central Morea and seek battle against the Byzantines. The army marched 
along the river Alpheios. At the castle of Karytaina the barons of Karytaina 
and Akova joined them with 150 cavalrymen and 200 armed infantrymen. 
The troops were divided into units (ἀλλάγια), and the lighter troops were 
sent to plunder the regions of Tsakonia and Gardalevos. The raid took five 
days and after that the troops returned to Nikli36.
The Chronicle claims that the Franks now heard that the Byzantine 
army was in Lakedaimon and did not move. They were told that after the 
defeats in Prinitsa and Makry-Plagi the emperor had given orders not to 
engage in battle with the Franks in the open, so that the whole Morea would 
33. Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [O]2. I believe that the commander can be identified 
with πρωτοβεστιαρίτης Aprenos, whose army of 5000 men was defeated by the Bulgarians 
in 1279 and Aprenos himself died [Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, VI.19, for dating 
the death of Aprenos see a. failler, Chronologie et composition dans l’histoire de Georges 
Pachymère, REB 38 (1980), 234–242].
34. Sailing was usually avoided between November and the end of February; after c. 
1300 the situation changed and the sea was “closed” only from December to the beginning of 
February (J. pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the maritime history of the 
Mediterranean. 649–1571, Cambridge 1988, 87-89).
35. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 205–209 (reg. v. 13 f. 208; fascic. Ang., 
XVIII, n. 10); I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. VII, no. XXI, 172; nos. XXVII, 20, 
83, 180; v. VIII, nos. XXXIII, 12-63, 79-85, 88, 96; v. VIII, nos. XXXV, 84, 104; Borghese, 
Carlo I d’Angiò, 106-108.
36. Livre de la conqueste, §§ 461–6; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 6525–6657; Bon, La 
Morée franque, 331. 
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not be lost. Instead the Emperor wanted the Byzantines to use generalship 
and stratagems, and to benefit from mountainous terrain and archers. 
Some Franks wanted to march against the Byzantines, but according to the 
Chronicle the wisest men advised the Prince not to do so. In the rough and 
wooded terrain the bowmen could shoot the unarmored horses of Franks 
without fear of punishment. The Prince was advised to stay in Nikli and 
use it as a base in order to prevent Byzantine raids towards central and 
north-east Morea. The Prince thought, however, that there was not enough 
food and fodder there, especially for the mercenaries. Thus he left only 100 
cavalrymen, 100 crossbowmen, 100 shield-bearers, and 300 archers at Nikli. 
They were ordered to patrol up to Veligoste and Chelmos (c. 20 km journey) 
and to prevent Byzantine raids37. 
Judging by the Angevin registers and Sanudo the main concern of 
Prince Guillaume and Dreux de Beaumont in 1272 might not have been 
Morea, but Euboia, where the Latin adventurer Licario, who had joined the 
Byzantine side and received help from them, caused troubles for the local 
Latin lords. These were vassals of the Prince. Guillaume and Dreux went 
to Euboia. According to Sanudo Prince Guillaume, who knew the ways of 
the enemy and kept his troops together, achieved success, but Dreux, who 
was ignorant of them, was defeated with his 700 cavalrymen, and he had 
to escape to the mountains after losing men, horses, and pack-animals. It 
is very likely that he was lured in ambush. Dreux was replaced by a new 
commander already on 8 July 1272. Prince Guillaume probably left Euboia 
also at this time38. 
37. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 6658–6720; for place identifications see Bon, La Morée 
franque, 364. The account in the French version differs slightly. For example it claims that 
above all the Turkish horse-archers were considered a threat, and it does not mention the 
infantry archers among the troops left in Nikli (Livre de la conqueste, §§ 466-70). The 
horse-archers were not the most natural type of soldiers for the rough terrain, and plausibly 
the author simply had the Frankish defeat at Pelagonia in mind (Livre de la conqueste, §§ 
297-305; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 4030-4091; Wilskman, Pelagonia, 156-157). The archers 
in Frankish service would most probably have been local Greeks or Saracens from southern 
Italy (göBBels, Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien, 100-33; Wilskman, Pelagonia, 141) and 
perhaps the author was unwilling to mention their role.
38. Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 129-131, 135-145; I Registri della Cancelleria 
Angioina, v. VIII, no. XXXVII, 750; v. XI, no. LIV, 118; Νικηφόρος Γρηγοράς, Ρωμαϊκή 
Ἱστορία, IV.5 (Nichephori Gregorae, Byzantina Historia), cura ludoviCi sChopeni, v. 1, 
Bonnae 1829, 144; kanellopoulos – lekea, Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική, 79. It has also 
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The situation in Euboia might have been the reason to abandon the 
attack on south-east Morea, if it was ever even intended.  This does not, 
however, mean that the description of the Chronicle is worthless. Actually 
it seems to describe accurately the strategic stalemate which followed the 
Byzantine conquest of the whole south-east and lasted almost to the time 
of writing of the Chronicle39. The terrain between Lakonia and the rest 
of Morea is difficult and the fortifications, both those already existing 
in Frankish times and the ones the Byzantines may have built, presented 
additional problems40. At least the Slavs and Tsakones seem to have been 
skilful light infantrymen (the main weapons apparently were bows and 
spears) and they knew the terrain.41 They would have been quite dangerous 
in the mountains. Kalavryta and the fortresses on the west side of Taygetos 
would have been more exposed to the Frankish attacks, but perhaps the 
Latins were afraid of committing troops to siege operations, which might 
leave some of their territories exposed to raids. Besides, at least in the area 
west of Taygetos the Byzantines might have been able to launch an attack 
directly on the Frankish flank.
The order of the Emperor to avoid open battles with the Franks, and 
instead use harassment, rough terrain, and missile weapons, corresponds 
been suggested that the campaign in Euboia actually took place in 1276 (papadopoulou, 
Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 276-277), but I find that the arguments are not strong 
enough. The account in the history book of Sanudo refers to 700 armed men who went 
together with Guillaume and Dreux to Euboia, and thus differs slightly from the version 
above, in which I have relied on one of Sanudo’s letters (it is published in f. kunsTmann, 
Studien über Marino Sanudo den Älteren mit einem Anhange seiner ungedruckten Briefe, 
in Königliche Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen der Phil.­Histor. 
Klasse 7, München 1855, no. II). Sanudo’s history book has only survived in translation and 
small distortions are likely.
39. For the geographical and political contexts of the writing of the Chronicle see 
especially shaWCross, The Chronicle of Morea, 42-44. 
40. On the fortification building, see below pp. 50 ff. 
41. For military experience, equipment, and quality of the Slavs and Tsakones see 
Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, III.9, 17; IV.26; Livre de la conqueste, § 206, 261, 696, 
823; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 1715–1725, 2985–3031, 3512–3514; Γεώργιος Ἀκροπολίτης 
Χρονικὴ Συγγραφὴ: Georgii Acropolitae Opera I, recensuit A. heisenBerg, Lipsiae 1903, 
§ 81; Documents sur le régime des terres dans la Principauté de Morée au XIVe siècle 
[Documents et recherches sur l’économie des pays byzantins, islamiques et slaves et leurs 
relations commerciales au moyen âge], eds. J. longnon – P. Topping, Paris 1969, 88–89, 
99–100; Wilskman, Pelagonia, 141; CaraTzas, Les Tzacones, 78–83.
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with the instructions which, according to the Byzantine sources, Emperor 
Michael VIII gave to the Byzantine armies facing the Latins at Pelagonia in 
1259 and Berat in 128142. This might have been Michael’s “official doctrine” 
in wars with the Franks, and even the composition of the army sent to 
Morea might have reflected the chosen strategy43. The Turks and Cumans 
were usually horse-archers, and the Greeks of the region of Nicaea were 
famous as bowmen44. With harassment tactics it was, however, impossible 
42. See Γεώργιος Ἀκροπολίτης Χρονικὴ Συγγραφὴ, 168-169. M. Ὁλόβωλος, Manuelis 
Holoboli orationes, v. I, ed. M. Treu [Programm des königlichen Victoria Gymnasiums 
zu Potsdam], Potsdam 1906, 40; L. previale (ed.), Un Panegirigo inedito per Michele 
VIII Paleologo, BZ 42 (1942), 35–6; Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, VI.32; Μαρίνος 
Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 145-147; Wilskman, Pelagonia, 145-6. Actually both in Pelagonia and 
Berat the favorable circumstances seem to have caused the Byzantine to change their plans 
and attack achieving significant victories (for my opinions about the events in Pelagonia see 
Wilskman, Pelagonia, 148-158. Unfortunately the PhD thesis of N. lappas, Πολιτική ιστορία 
του κράτους της Ηπείρου κατά τον 13ο αι. (University of Thessaloniki 2007) has not been 
available for me. For studies about the battle of Berat see especially e. sygkellou, Ο πόλεμος 
στον δυτικό ελλαδικό χώρο κατά τον ύστερο Μεσαίωνα (13ος-15ος αι.) [Institute for 
Byzantine Research, Monographs 8], Athens 2008, 220-222; kanellopoulos, Η οργάνωση 
και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού, 112-118).
43. Compare Wilskman, Pelagonia, 146. See also kanellopoulos – lekea, Η βυζαντινή 
πολεμική τακτική, 75-79. As stated in the beginning of the article the traditional image of 
Byzantine warfare is that the Byzantines tried to avoid open battles. Recent research has, 
however, diversified this image by pointing out that in some periods during their long history 
the Byzantines seem to have been quite willing to engage in pitched battles and that different 
adversaries were countered with different methods [see for example i. syvänne, The Age of 
Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491–636), Tampere 
2004, 113-117; J. Birkenmeier, The Development of the Komnenian Army. 1081–1180 
[History of Warfare 5], Leiden 2002, 45-46, 66-74, 82; kanellopoulos, Η οργάνωση και η 
τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού, 283-324]. Thus one cannot consider it as self-evident that 
the Byzantines always wanted to rely on the strategy of avoiding battles. I dealt with the issue 
more closely in my paper “Avoiding pitched battles in Byzantine warfare against the Latins 
during the thirteenth century: Benefits and drawbacks” held during the 22nd International 
Congress of Byzantine Studies in Sofia (25 August 2011) and I intend to discuss this issue 
further in my PhD. 
44. Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, II.20; III.12. I find it plausible that many of the 
bow men from the frontier of Byzantine Anatolia were horse-archers (Wilskman, Pelagonia, 
149).
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to achieve decisive victory45, if some lucky change did not favor as happened 
at Pelagonia and Berat. Even conducting sieges was difficult for the armies, 
which wanted to avoid battles, because if the enemy relief army came to help, 
the siege had to be abandoned. The exceptions were the situations, when 
the enemy main forces were committed elsewhere (as it might have been at 
the time of Tagliacozzo and after). Of course we do not know whether the 
Byzantines still wanted to take the whole Peninsula.
Light troops could, however, make fast raids and cause destruction. 
This kind of activities the Franks probably tried to stop with their bases 
and patrols. Apart from Nikli, Grand-Arachova seems to have served as 
a Frankish base. But keeping the men ready in one place was not without 
problems. Apparently in 1275 a “stomach disease” broke out in Grand-
Arakhova and killed several men including the famous baron of karytaina, 
one of the main heroes in the Chronicle of Morea. The Chronicle credits its 
hero with the last chance to make a raid against the Byzantines and defeat 
them before dying46. Several war-related diseases are especially prone to 
break out if the army has to stay in the same place for a long time. Diseases 
in general were a major cause of death in pre-industrial wars, and probably 
killed more people than major battles did47.
45. For the importance of battles in order to get strategic gains in offensive warfare 
during the middle ages see C. J. rogers, The Vegetian “Science of Warfare” in the Middle 
Ages, Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 1-19.
46. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 7189–7219, 8334–8336; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 494–7, 
576; Bon, La Morée franque, 143; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 294. The location 
of Grand-Arachova is controversial (see for example Bon, La Morée franque, 377-389). 
Romaios, however, claims that near Arachova of Lacedaimon, which is one of the candidates, 
there is a river, whose waters are said cause typhoid fever (k. romaios, Τοπογραφικά της 
Φραγκοκρατίας, Πελοποννησιακά 2 (1957), 6).
47. For example the casualty rate of non-combatant clergy during the Crusade 
campaigns, which lasted for 2-4 years was 15-20%, while for the knights it was about twice 
as much. The mortality rate of poorer people from hunger and diseases would most probably 
have been higher and for example in the eighteenth century the armies on campaign lost 
almost regularly 20% of their men to diseases, hunger and desertion. For the casualty rates 
during the Crusades see p. miTChell, Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, Wounds and the 
Medieval Surgeon, Cambridge 2004, 143–145, 177. In 18th century warfare C. duffy, The 
Military Experience in the Age of Reason, London 1987, 173. See also J. BradBury, The 
Medieval Siege, Woodbridge 1992, 82-84.
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Having troops in readiness also caused financial strains. The fief holders 
of south-Italy were obligated to serve three months in a year in the army, 
and the fief holders of the Principality of Achaia four months in the field 
army and four months in the garrisons (the ecclesiastical fiefs were free 
from garrison duty)48. The paid troops however required wages and in 1273 
the Angevine commander had to take loans to support them. At this time 
Charles seems to have had French, Provençal, and Latini (evidently Italian) 
paid troops in Morea. Charles also sent rowers to the galleys of the Prince, 
and 1273 Saracen bowmen from Lucera were shipped to Morea. Göbbels has 
estimated (on the basis of 232 gold ounces for one and half months’ wages) 
that there were 450 of them. It is possible that the Byzantines also had 
troubles with financing their troops. In his letters from the years 1280 and 
1283 Charles refers to Turkish and Cuman (or Bulgarian) troops, who had 
apparently deserted from the Byzantine side at the time of Prince Guillaume. 
Most of the Turks might have been part of the group, which chose to stay 
in Morea in 1264 and received baptism. The Cumans (or Bulgarians) must 
have switched sides later. Naturally it is also possible that the Angevin 
chancellery might have confused different distant nations49.
Indeed, the Latins seem to have enjoyed some success. From the years 
1273-1274 we have orders from king Charles related to a group of prisoners 
–some of them Greeks from Morea–, who were transferred to the castle 
of Trani in south-Italy. This case is interesting insofar as it reveals how 
prisoners were treated in warfare between the Latins and the Byzantines. 
48. Livre de la conqueste, §§ 129–131; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 1990–2016; G. 
reCoura (ed.), Les Assises de Romanie, Paris 1930, § 70; göBBels, Militärwesen im Königreich 
Sizilien, 95–97. Almost all historians, who have studied the Principality of Achaia, have 
commented its fief-system and “feudalism”. I would, however, especially like to mention p. 
Topping, Feudal Institutions as revealed in the Assizes of Romania the Law code of Frankish 
Greece [Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of History vol. 3.], Philadelphia 
1949.
49. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana (1916), 201–202 (reg., v. 3, f. 53), 212–225 (reg., v. 
19, f. 157 t.; reg., v. 3, f. 13 t.), 231; I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. IX, nos. XLVII, 
20, 23, 42, 44, 51, 72; v. X, nos. XLVIII, 101, 104, 159, 174, 185, 256–7, 292; v. XI, no. LIV, 
191; no. LVII, 73; v. XII, no. LXVI, 26; v. XII, nos. LXVIII, 518-521, 543-4; v. XXIII, no. 
XCV, 128; nos. XCVII, 199, 200; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 296; C. minieri-riCCio, Il 
Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 17 April 1273, 24 April 1273, 8 May 1283; göBBels, Militärwesen 
im Königreich Sizilien, 121–2; Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 110, 114-115. 
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The king’s orders were to treat the above mentioned group of prisoners well, 
but they were to be held in chains, and not in the upper parts of the castle 
but in the subterranean chambers. In February 1274 the king ordered the 
Greek prisoners to be transferred to the castle of Canossa, the prisoners were 
not allowed to speak with anyone, and iron chains needed to be provided. In 
June the prisoners sent an application to Charles begging permission that 
they could send a message to their relatives through a middleman and request 
money for necessary expenses. Charles gave his permission and issued an 
order to ease the imprisonment and make the conditions healthier. There 
are also other sources which confirm that it was common for the Latins and 
Byzantines to keep their prisoners in chains, and that Charles had a practice 
that the prisoners should at least partly cover their own expenses50.
The lull and the fortification building
Apparently the Angevins made preparations for sending a fleet from 
south-Italy to Achaia in the late winter and early spring of 1274, but it is 
not clear whether the ships left the ports. There seem to have been difficulties 
in gathering ship crews, and Charles threatened those who did not go into 
service with loss of property and destruction of houses51. Actually a more 
quiet period at the front seems to have begun around April, when Prince 
Guillaume received the commandership of the Angevin troops in Morea in 
addition to the troops of the Principality. We also have information about 
the founding of a new Cistercian hospital in Frankish territory. Plausibly, the 
negotiations concerning the union of churches, which officially took place in 
July 1274, made both warring sides cautious about doing something which 
would upset the pope. Besides, Charles had financial troubles. There might 
have been a truce agreement for one year after the council of Lyon. Possibly 
at this time the noble Frankish ladies who were given to the Byzantines 
50. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 228–231 (reg. v. 3, f. 57; reg. v. 18, f. 31); 
minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 8 April 1273, 28 February 1274, 14 March 1274, 
26 June 1274, 6 October 1274, 3 August 1277, 9 September 1282; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 
5513–5517; Livre de la conqueste, § 693; Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, I.11; III.28; 
V.1, 2; Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [A]38; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 299-300.
51. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 6 February 1274, 24 March 1274, 27 
March 1274; Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 233; J. dunBaBin, Charles I of Anjou. 
Power, Kingship and State­Making in Thirteenth­Century Europe, London and New York 
1998, 176; Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 111.
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as hostages as part of the peace agreement in 1262 also got back home 
apparently unharmed52.
Sanudo is not explicit about precisely when the Byzantines built their 
strong castles and fortified the passes. South-East Morea (like the rest of the 
Peninsula) is dotted with medieval fortifications, whose constructors and 
building dates are uncertain53. Some of these might have been built by the 
Byzantines during this war or immediately afterwards, a possibility often 
overlooked by previous scholars. The mainstream of current researchers 
mainly credit the Byzantines for the thirteenth century city walls of Mistra, 
which surround the city and divide it into upper and lower parts. The castle 
of Mistra had been built by Prince Guillaume, but apparently it became a 
city only in Byzantine times, when the Greek people of Lakedaimon moved 
there. The exact time when the walls were built is uncertain, but for example 
the frescoes from the Metropolitan church just inside the outer curtain were 
made in 1270-1300, and the most likely terminus ante quem is 128254.
52. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana, (1916), 226, 231-232; I Registri della Cancelleria 
Angioina, v. XI, no. LIX, 101; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 4343–4562, 7301–7335; Livre 
de la conqueste, §§ 501–504; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 294-296; Borghese, Carlo 
I d’Angiò, 111, 124-130, 206-208; geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the 
West, 237-245; Bon, La Morée franque, 143-144; k. seTTon, The Papacy and the Levant 
(1204–1271). Part 1: The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Philadephia 1976, 112-120. It 
is also possible, and perhaps more sensible, that the hostages were liberated already during 
the prisoner exchange following the battle of Makry-Plagi (Libro de los Fechos, §§ 381-399; 
Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, III.17; B. hendriCkx, Οι θεσμοί της Φραγκοκρατίας. 
Η Λατινική Αυτοκρατορία της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και το Λατινικό Βασίλειο της 
Θεσσαλονίκης, Thessaloniki 2007, 367-369).
53. The most comprehensive and accessible list is probably found in g. shipley, 
Archaeological Sites in Laconia and the Thyreatis, in Continuity and Change in a Greek 
Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey, Volume 2, Archaeological data, eds. W. Cavanaugh 
– J. CrouWel – r. CaTling – g. shipley, London 1996, 263–313. Also useful are J. Chapman, 
Mani: A Guide and History, 2001–2006, www/zorbas.de/maniguide.de and van leuven, The 
Phantom Baronies of the Western Mani (op. cit.).
54. For the walls of Mistra see k. andreWs, Castles of the Morea, Princeton New 
Jersey 1953, 159–182, 225–227; a. paradissis, Fortresses and Castles of Greece, v. 2, 
Athens 1982, 180-184. I have also visited the site in person. For the dating of the frescoes 
in the Metropolitan church see s. kalopissi-verTi, The Impact of the Fourth Crusade on 
Monumental Painting in the Peloponnese and Eastern Central Greece up to the End of the 
Thirteenth Century, in Byzantine Art in the Aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. The Fourth 
Crusade and its Consequences, International Congress, March 9­12, 2004, Athens 2007, 
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I believe that one very strong candidate as a Byzantine built fortress 
is the castle of Chelmos. It is situated on a mountain between Lakonia and 
the Alpheios-valley, i.e. precisely in the region where the frontier between 
the Franks and the Byzantines stabilized. The Chronicle of Morea refers to 
Chelmos as a place-name during the events which apparently took place in 
1263 and 1272, but as a castle it is mentioned for the first time in the 1290s. 
At that time it was in Byzantine hands55.
Another likely candidate as a Byzantine-built castle, referred to by 
Sanudo, is Zarnata in north-west Mani. It dominates the plain of Kampos 
and the coastal route to south. The place has been fortified in ancient, 
medieval, and modern times, although not continuously, and when the 
medieval fortress was built is uncertain. The Chronicle of Morea does not 
mention the place, although it has been connected with the Frankish barony 
in the area of Gritsena and the Lakkoi56. The Venetian claims document of 
1278, however, refers to Zarnata as a place which was in Byzantine hands 
and evidently had an imperial captain in charge. Zarnata is only 20 km from 
kalamata, which had a Frankish castle, and I doubt that the Byzantines 
would have placed an official there if it was not fortified57.
Furthermore it is possible that medieval fortifications at Pellana 
(between Chelmos and Mistra) and kyparissi (on the east-coast) were built 
by the Byzantines; both are hill-fortresses, while kyparissi watched over a 
good anchorage58. These castles are also located in the area where the frontier 
83-84. It has been suggested that Mistra was a fortified town already before the Franks came 
(C. foss – d. Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications: An Introduction, Pretoria 1986, 30-31, 
143), but I find this hardly convincing.
55. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 4664, 6718; Livre de la conqueste, § 814. For description 
of the site see Bon, La Morée franque, 516–518, 662–663; W. loring, Some Ancient Routes 
in the Peloponnese, JHS 15 (1895), 71-74. 
56. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 1944–1945; A. kriesis, On the Castles of Zarnáta and 
kelefá, BZ 56 (1963), 309–313.
57. Tafel – Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [H]16, [J]7. For descriptions of the site see Bon, La 
Morée franque, 507-508; kriesis, On the Castles of Zarnáta and kelefá, 308-313; andreWs, 
Castles of the Morea, 24-27; Chapman, Mani: A Guide and History; Venetians and Knights 
Hospitallers: Military Architecture Networks, eds. a. Triposkoufi, a. TsiTouri, Athens 
2002, 62-63.
58. shipley, Archaeological Sites in Laconia, 282–283, 288; loring, Some Ancient 
Routes in the Peloponnese, 44–46; RE, v. II, 3 Silencenis-Stluppi, entry Sparta, C. Geographie 
(f. BölTe); a. J. B. WaCe, f. W. hasluCk, East Central Laconia, British School of Archaeology 
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was stabilized. Most of the other undated, possibly, medieval fortifications 
in south-east Morea are further away. If the fortresses were constructed 
during the war and close to the enemy, this was probably at a time when the 
Franks were engaged elsewhere, in Euboia for example, or when there was 
some sort of temporary truce.
The “robberies” and military actions did not cease totally. Especially at 
sea the ships of the men of Emperor made their raids even in the area of the 
Ionian Sea. Perhaps the Byzantine naval victory over the Latin lords of Greek 
islands in 1273 made the naval actions easier. Besides at some point before 
1275 (possibly already 1262-3) the Byzantines had taken over the island of 
Kythera in a strategic place near the south coast of Morea. It was evidently 
ruled by a governor from Monemvasia. The inhabitants of Monemvasia were 
active participants in sea robberies. From the Venetian claims document we 
know that the imperial naval vessels and corsairs captured shiploads worth 
of hundreds of gold pieces in the waters of Morea59. 
15 (1908–1909), 173–174. Fortifications in Gardiki and Pedema might also be built by 
Byzantines, but probably after the period discussed in this study (BreuilloT, Châteaux 
Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale, 202-220, 230-241).
59. a. dandulo, Chronica per extensum descripta (aa. 46–1280 d. C.), ed. E. 
pasTorello, [Rerum Italicarum Scriptores XII] Milan 1728 (Bologna 1938), 323, 5–7; Tafel 
– Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [G]10-[H]11, [J]8, [k]2, 8, [M]10. For the sea-“robberies” in the 
waters of Morea or made by Monemvasiotes see Tafel – Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [A]10–11, 
25–27, 38, 40, 53, [C]5–7, [D]11, [F]3, 17–18, [G]9, [J]2-6, 8- 9, 15, [k]1, 9–10, [L]2-4, 7-9, 
12–3, 18, [M]8, [O]12. About the naval battle Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, IV.31-32; 
Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 133-135; failler, Chronologie et composition dans l’histoire 
de Georges Pachymère, 189–202. kythera had not been a part of the principality, but under 
Venier-family, who were Venetian patricians settled in Crete. We do not know how it ended 
up in the hands of the Byzantines [about Kythera see Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 143; 
Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [A]53; J. herrin, Byzantine Kythera, in Kythera. Excavations 
and Studies Conducted by The University of Pennsylvania Museum and The British School at 
Athens, eds. J. n. ColdsTream – g. l. huxley, London 1972, 48-50; papadopoulou, Μαρίνος 
Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 275-276; m. koumanoudi, Illi de Ca’Venier; The First Venetian Lords of 
Kythera, in Venezia e Cerigo, Atti del Simposio Internazionale, Venezia 6­7 Dicembre 2002, 
eds. Ch. malTezou and m. koumanoudi, Venezia 2003, 88-93; Ch. gasparis, Cerigo sotto 
il Dominio Veneto. Problemi Economici di un’isola di importanza strategica, in Venezia e 
Cerigo, op.cit, 107-9; Ch. malTezou, Le famiglie degli Eudaimonoianis e Venier a Cerigo dal 
XII al XIV secolo. Problemi di cronologia e prosopografia, RSBS 2 (1982), 208-217 (reprinted 
in Ch. malTezou, Βενετική παρουσία στα Κύθηρα, Αρχειακές μαρτυρίες, Athens 1991, 
Η)].
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Monemvasia was a maritime city, and like its traders, its corsairs could 
also sail far. In addition the Slavs and other inhabitants of the Mani peninsula 
made “robberies” at sea and in harbors, although they needed to restrict 
their activities to coastal sailing, where the booty’s worth was usually less 
than 100 hyperpyra. A typical case is the one of “Alberto Marangono” and 
“Johannes Conte”. They were sailing from korone to a harbor in Mani with 
a ship carrying olives and salt. When they were at Beaufort a group of men 
from Lakonia came to the ship and robbed it. The Venetian commission 
claimed 60 hyperpyra for this incident60. 
An interesting case took place in 1277 when 13 “men of the Emperor” 
from kalavryta robbed a Venetian, who was travelling from Patras to 
Naupaktos. kalavryta is inland, but the incident probably occurred at sea. 
Perhaps the attackers had taken a boat from the coast. According to the 
claims document they gained booty worth 75 hyperpyra. If the information 
was right, the attackers were Byzantine soldiers, and if the Byzantines’ 
customary practice about the division of the spoils, was followed61, then 
every men would have received 2.3 hyperpyra. This was equivalent to 
approximately one month’s wage. Sanudo tells that at this time for every 
two denari a corsair captain invested he got back three, and if he fought 
against other pirates four62. 
The corsairs could also make raids against the coastal inhabitants. The 
claims document informs us that in April 1277 “Lanfrancus Chavallari 
of Thessaloniki” attacked southern Messenia with a ship from Ania in 
60. Tafel – Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [A]41, [H]14, 18–24, [J]1; one could also add [H]15, 
which took place near Mistra (i.e. in inland), but otherwise similar. About Monemvasia 
see h. kalligas, Monemvasia, Seventh–Fifteenth Centuries, in The Economic History of 
Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century, v. 2, Editor-in-Chief A. laiou, 
Washington D. C. 2002, 884–895; D. A. zakyThinos, Le despotat grec de Morée, 254-263.
61. The Emperor should have got 1/5, the grand-domestikos (the official leader of the 
army) 1/5, the other commanders 1/5, and the men were entitled to the rest (see pseudo-
kodinos, 251; Ioannes kantakuzenus, Ἱστορίαι ΙΙ.32: Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris 
Historiarum libri IV, v. 1, cura ludoviCi sChopeni, Bonnae 1828, 495-501; s. kyriakidis, The 
Division of booty in late Byzantium (1204-1453), JÖB 59 (2009), 165-166, 167-169, 175).
62. Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [A]38; Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 173-175; 
Charanis, Piracy in the Aegean, 131-132. The estimate of the wages is based on a contract 
between the Emperor Michael VIII and the Genoese in 1261 (Regesten der Kaiserurkunden 
der Oströmisches Reiches, v. III, eds. F. dölger, P. WirTh, München 1977, no. 1890).
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Byzantine Anatolia. This town was a base for several corsairs. He took both 
men and women as prisoners and also harmed the Venetians. It has been 
inferred that Lanfrancus enslaved these locals63. This is, however, problematic 
if Lanfrancus really operated under the Emperor as the document claims. 
Evidently the Byzantines did not enslave Orthodox, their brothers in religion. 
One would also assume that the Catholic men of the Emperor would have 
been required to respect the practice. Naturally they might have ignored it, 
and there are cases where even Orthodox slaved Orthodox. Perhaps it was 
a question of forced migration, a practice common to the Byzantines and 
somehow in a gray zone in relation to slavery64.
Latins could enslave Orthodox Christians (and theoretically vice versa) 
who were captured in war. Especially in the fourteenth century there was 
a large-scale slave trade of Greeks, mainly women65. Actually among the 
notarial papers of Ragusa there is a document concerning the manumission 
of a slave girl, Maria of Clarenza, on 17 May 1281. There is no information 
on how, why, and when Maria was enslaved. She might have been captured in 
the war of Morea, but from the Ragusan archives we also know a case dated 
5 May 1268 where a Moreote woman, who had unable to pay the loan she 
had taken because of hunger, promised to spend 10 years in servitude66. 
Enslaving even “schismatic Christians” was, however, always considered 
somehow problematic. For example on 6 December 1274, king Charles gave 
to two south-Italian provinces an order to free all Greek and Albanian slaves 
and let them go where they wanted. This order was probably related to the 
63. Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [J]4; morgan, The Venetian Claims Commission, 
421-425.
64. For the Byzantine enslavement practices and forced migration, see for example 
h. köpsTein, Zur Sklaverei im ausgehenden Byzanz: Philologisch­historische Untersuchung, 
Berlin 1966, 56-69; kyriakidis, The Division of booty, 169-170. 
65. For slavery in Latin Christendom see especially C. verlinden, L’esclavage dans 
l’Europe médiévale, v. 2, Gent 1977; n. mosChonas, Der Sklavenmarkt im östlichen 
Mittelmeer raum in der Palaiologenzeit, SüdostF 65/66 (2006/7), 28-49.
66. Les Régestes des Documents des Archives de Raguse concernant le Levant, in 
Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge, ed. B. KreKić, Paris 1963, nos. 9, 17. From 
1291-1292 we have information about the slaves (both men and women) in the Venetian 
colony of Methone in Morea, who judging by names were Greeks (Pasquale Longo, notaio 
in Corone 1289­1293, ed. A. lomBardo, Venezia 1951, nos. 71, 94; verlinden, L’esclavage, 
801–802). We have, however, no information on where they came from and why they had 
been enslaved.
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church union and Charles’ close contacts with the Greek rulers of Epeiros 
and Thessaly at this time67. I doubt that Charles would have freed soldiers of 
Michael Palaiologos without conditions, and these would probably not have 
been enslaved. Anyway, the number of Greek slaves in the Latin slave markets 
does not seem to have been significant in the period under discussion. None 
is, for example, among the 206 sales of a slave mentioned in the surviving 
notary registers of Ragusa from 1281-1283. It might also be worth noting 
that, although according to the Venetian claims document of 1278 several 
Venetians were held prisoners, there is no indication of enslavement. The 
Venetians captured in connection with the war in Morea, and whose fate 
we know, were released after a few weeks and, far as we can tell, without 
conditions68. 
The episode of Geoffroy de Bruyères the Younger, which is described 
in the Chronicle of Morea, possibly took place in the mid-1270s. He came 
from France with eight sergeants69 to claim the heritage of the baron of 
karytaina. The plea was refused. The angry Geoffroy de Bruyères now took 
the castle of Araklovon (French Bucelet) from the men of the Principality 
by a clever stratagem. He pretended to be sick and got inside the castle, and 
when its small garrison was in the tavern below his men closed them in and 
took the castle. They freed the twelve prisoners there (Byzantines and local 
peasants) and sent two of them to the Byzantines to ask for help, promising 
to hand over them the castle70. 
The men of the Principality and Angevin troops reacted quickly. Simon 
de Vidoigne, who was defending the central Morea with Arachova as his 
67. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 6 December 1274. For the contacts 
between Charles and Epeiros, and Thessaly, see geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus 
and the West, 275; Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 130-133.
68. Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXX [A]38, 40, [D]2, [H]15, 18, 19, 21. köpstein has 
made the same observation concerning the lack of enslavement of Venetians in the claims 
document of 1278 (köpsTein, Zur Sklaverei, 80-84). For Ragusa see verlinden, L’esclavage, 
743–765.
69. Sergeant was a foot-soldier or cavalryman without the status of knight (C. marshall, 
Warfare in the Latin East. 1192–1292, Cambridge 1992, 48-50; J. franCe, Western Warfare in 
the Age of the Crusades. 1000­1300, London 1999, 58-63; Bon, La Morée franque, 85-89).
70. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8110-8330; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 557-72; I Registri 
della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XIII, no. LXX, 479; hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 321; 
Bon, La Morée franque, 148. The version of Libro de los Fechos (§§ 428-46) differs slightly 
in details.
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base, blockaded Araklovon and closed the roads and passes leading there. 
The representative of king Charles arrived from Clarenza with his troops 
and heard that the Byzantine κεφαλή had already arrived at the ford of 
Alpheios. De Vidoigne was sent to block his way (according to the French 
Chronicle) with 100 cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen. Geoffroy de Bruyères 
and his men were threatened with the claim that a bigger army was coming, 
and men were sent to call Venetian siege-engineers to build a trebuchet. At 
the same time the besiegers expressed understanding towards the actions 
of Geoffroy and told him that a diplomatic solution was possible. Geoffroy 
married the widow of a Moreot noble and received a sizeable fief71.
The contingent sent against the Byzantines seems to have been quite 
small indicating that the Byzantine forces were not sizeable either. Most 
of the “robberies” mentioned in the Venetian claims document and which 
had something to do with the war in Morea were also made by the local 
inhabitants or corsairs, which might indicate that there were not many 
imperial troops left in the Peninsula and mainly the locals were responsible 
for the defense. On the other hand the Venetian claim document only list 
incidents, which were considered to be against the treaty made by the 
Emperor, and it is likely that irregulars and corsairs were more prone to 
those than the proper imperial troops. It might be worth of noting that the 
Venetian siege-engineers were supposed to build the trebuchets, and this 
is not the only reference about the men of the Principality relying on the 
Venetian engineers for siege-engines72.
The period of “baillis”
Prince Guillaume died on 1 May 1278 and king Charles became the 
direct ruler of the Principality. He was represented by a “bailli”; the first 
71. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8331-8473; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 573-85. The Greek 
version does not reveal the number of troops de Vidoigne sent against the κεφαλή, but tells 
about the men of Skorta, kalamata, Perigardios, Vostitza, and Chalandritza indicating the 
troops composed of local men of the Principality.
72. See Livre de la conqueste, § 820. kanellopoulos has made the same notion about 
the role of Venetians as siege-engineers for the Principality of Achaia (kanellopoulos, Η 
οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού, 329-330). About the Venetian traditions 
for building siege-engines see a. seTTia, L’apparto militare, in Storia di Venezia dalle origini 
alla caduta della Serenissima, v. II, l’età del commune, eds. G. CraCCo – gh. orTalli, Roma 
1995, 472-474.
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was Galeran d’Ivry73. The Italian historian Saba Malaspina mentions that in 
the same year the Franks commanded by Gautier de Sumoroso attacked to 
the lands of Greeks in Morea, trusting only to their courage. The Greeks had 
superior numbers, and they defeated the Franks totally, capturing Gautier 
and several other important men. Otherwise Saba Malaspina writes about 
this war only that fortune favored sometimes the Byzantines and sometimes 
the Franks, and that Charles often sent new troops and commanders to 
Morea74. Perhaps new men, unaccustomed to the Byzantine ways of war, 
allowed themselves to fall into ambush prepared by the locals.
D’Ivry did not get along well with the local strong men, and apparently 
there were problems relating to the payments for mercenaries. When a new 
bailli came in August 1280 it is reported that castles lacked provisions and 
the garrisons had not received wages for three to twelve months. In order 
to support themselves, the mercenaries plundered villages in central Morea 
which had only temporarily been in the enemy hands, causing in this way 
great harm to the local fief holders. A document from the year 1283 refers to 
mercenaries who had gone to the Byzantine side because of the lack of pay75. 
Perhaps this happened during the period of d’Ivry. It is notable that since 
the Franks relied more on fief-holding troops, the problems of paying the 
73. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 26 August1278; Το Χρονικόν του 
Μορέως, 7753-7939; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 532-544; Bon, La Morée franque, 150-154; 
hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 315-316. According to the Chronicle of Morea the first 
bailli, who is wrongly identified, brought with him 50 cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen, 
apparently crossbowmen. These soldiers were elite mercenaries. In addition, the documents 
from Naples reveal sending of victuals, textiles, one mason, and two carpenters to the 
Principality. In May, already before the news about the death of the Prince arrived, Charles 
had ordered troops sent to Achaia. This contingent included at least 50 crossbowmen 
[Cerone, La sovranità napoletana (1917), 59-67 (reg. 1, f. 152; reg. 32, f. 226; reg. 32, f. 222 t; 
reg. 26, f. 106; reg. 32, f. 32; reg. 32, f. 233; reg. 32, f. 222 t); minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo 
I D’Angiò, 2-19 May 1278, 1-2 September 1278]. 
74. saBa malaspina, Chronica, ed. W. koller – A. niTsChe, [MGH Scriptores XXXV] 
Hannover 1999, 260-262; I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XLIV, additiones ad reg. 
LXXXII, 701.
75. hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 316-318; minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I 
D’Angiò, 18 May 1279, 8 May 1283; I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXIII, no. 
XCV, 48; v. XXV, no. CIV, 5; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8523-8529; göBBels, Militärwesen 
im Königreich Sizilien, 29–30.
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mercenaries did not mark a turning point in the war similar to the desertion 
of the Turks from the Byzantine army in 1264.
When the next bailli, Philippe de Lagonesse, came in August 128076 
he brought with him money for three months’ wages for the paid troops of 
the king in Morea. The document also provides the numbers of these: there 
were 16 knights, 160 paid cavalrymen, 22 mounted crossbowmen, and 82 
normal crossbowmen. This kind of contingent should have had 230 squires 
and garziones, if the regulations concerning the ratio of followers per man 
on horse were followed77. The troops of the Principality itself (perhaps 500 
heavy cavalrymen plus infantry)78 were not included in these figures, but 
anyhow the modest numbers79 indicate that there was not a large Byzantine 
army against them in Morea.
76. Two years seem to have been the normal period in office for baillis (hopf, Griechenland 
im Mittelalter, 316; sampsonis, L’administration de la Morée, 146, 149-150).
77. I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXIII, no. XCV, 205-211, 216; no. 
XCVIII, 225; no. XCVII, 236; minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 3 August 1280, 8 
August 1280; göBBels, Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien, 34–36; hopf, Griechenland im 
Mittelalter, 317-318. Lagonessa brought with him 50 horses to replace the ones lost in battle. 
From the documents concerning his appointment to office of we also learn that every knight 
received four gold ounces per month, the other cavalrymen and mounted crossbowmen two, 
and that the wage of an infantryman was 12 tari per month (30 tari = 1 gold ounce = 27g, see 
Borghese, Carlo I d’Angiò, 22). 
78. For the military potential of the Principality of Achaia, see Wilskman, Pelagonia, 
139-141.
79. We have for example a similar document from March 1281for the troops besieging 
Berat. There are 82 knights, 681 other cavalrymen, 78 mounted crossbowmen, 227 infantrymen 
from the north side of the Alps, 410 archers, 150 crossbowmen, and numbers of craftsmen. 
Every knight had to have one squire and two garziones, other mounted men had to have one 
garzionem. Sanudo claims that there were 2000 uomini d’arme and 6000 infantrymen in the 
Angevin army at Berat (I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXV, no. CIV, 16; Μαρίνος 
Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 145). At Viterbo Charles had promised 2000 heavy cavalrymen for 
the Latin Emperor; in 1281 he made a contract with the Venetians for transporting 8000 
horses, and men in the usual ratio to horses, against Constantinople (BuChon, Recherches et 
matériaux, nos. 49, 232; Tafel – Thomas, no. CCCLXXIII). It should be noted that usually 
only one horse per cavalryman was transported by sea (see for example Tafel – Thomas, 
no. XCII). For further discussion about the size of the armies during this era see especially 
my forthcoming article about the battle of Prinitsa and, for example, BarTusis, The Late 
Byzantine Army, 258-269; T. kolias, Military aspects of the conquest of Constantinople by 
the Crusaders, in Urbs capta. The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences (La IVe Croisade 
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After 1278 we no longer have the Venetian claims document for help, 
but the Emperor’s ships were clearly still causing troubles, and there were 
preparations against them even on the coast of Sicily. On the coast of Morea 
were 10 galleys commanded by Gérard de Marseille, which had been sent 
there in May 1280. Five terides, two galleys, and one galeone, which formed 
the convoy transporting Lagonessa, were ordered to join them. De Marseille’s 
navy was ordered to stay on the coast of Morea until November, and one of 
the terides in Lagonesa’s convoy brought victuals for it80.
The Sicilian Vespers and war against Aragon broke out in 1282; this 
was the main concern of the Angevins for the next 20 years. In December 
1283 the crown prince, who represented his absentee father in South-Italy, 
gave several orders which could be described as almost symbolic for the 
diminishing scale and significance of the conflict in Morea. The supplies 
intended for Achaia were to be given to ships going to Sicily; the bailli, 
Duke of Athens, and the “Despotes of Epiros”, who asked for help, received 
the answer that not numbers, but military skills, bring victory in war. Four 
Byzantine prisoners kept in Italy were exchanged for de Sumoroso and three 
men captured with him. Erard, the lord of Arkadia, was not among those 
liberated, and apparently he had died during the five-year captivity81.
The Angevin court did not totally forget the war in Morea. In May 
1283 the bailli was ordered to ensure the payment of wages, including the 
ones for the Turks and Bulgarians, so that the troops would not desert to the 
Byzantine side anymore, but on the contrary there would be deserters from 
et ses consequences), ed. a. laiou [Réalités Byzantines 10], Paris 2005, 127-131; Wilskman, 
Pelagonia, 139-145; kanellopoulos, Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού, 
261-264. For the potential problems relating the figures in medieval narrative sources see, 
for example, J. flori, La valeur des nombres chez les chroniqueurs du Moyen Age. A propos 
des effectifs de la première Croisade, Le Moyen­Age, Revue d’histoire et de Philologie XCIX, 
3-4 (1993), 399-422.
80. I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXIII, no. XCIV, 274; nos. XCV, 200, 206, 
209, 211; no. XCVII, 129, 131, 235; nos. XCVIII, 229; göBBels, Militärwesen im Königreich 
Sizilien, 34-35; geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 335-340. See also 
pryor, Soldiers of Fortune in the Fleets of Charles I of Anjou, 130-131.The upkeep of a galley 
seems to have cost 50 gold ounces per month (I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXIII, 
no. XCV, 206). A galeone was a smaller version of a galley, perhaps with 40-72 oars (göBBels, 
op. cit., 253).
81. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 3 December 1283, 5 December 1283, 
22 December 1283.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:01:56 |
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 22 (2012) 31-70
A LATE BYZANTINE ENDEMIC WAR 61
the Byzantine side to the Franks. The bailli also received an order that the 
people from the Principality or persons who owned a fief there should not 
serve in the castle garrisons, but instead men from the northern side of the 
Alps should82. Probably the king had other use for the locals.
In 1284 the Angevins sent 100 horses as a replacement for the lost 
mounts, and also in 1288 we hear about transport of horses and victuals83.
The Franks of Romania took also defensive measures of their own in 
the 1280s. The Duke of Athens, Guillaume de la Roche, is credited with 
building the castle of Demetra in south central Morea during the time 
he served as bailli. Demetra was probably built for defense against the 
Byzantines and according to the Chronicle of Morea it was destroyed by 
them. Unfortunately the Chronicle does not tell us when this happened. 
The successor of Guillaume was Nicholas II de Saint Omer, lord of half 
of Thebes and husband of the widow of Guillaume de Villehardouin. He is 
said to have built the castle of Old Navarino in the south-western corner of 
the Peninsula. The castle of Navarino watched over an important harbor. It 
was more distant from the Byzantine territories, but Byzantine ships had 
committed “robberies” there84.
82. minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 8 May 1283. This has been seen as a 
mark of distrust towards the local Franks (for example by miller, A History of Frankish 
Greece, 163-164), but the bailli at that time, Guy de Dramelay belonged to the nobility of 
the Principality, as did the new castellan of Clarenza (I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, 
v. XXVI, no. CX, 176; no. CXI, 84; no. CXII, 174). About Guy de Dramelay see for example 
hopf, Griechenland im Mittelalter, 326-327; Bon, La Morée franque, 158-159; sampsonis, 
L’administration de la Morée, 152-153.
83. I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXVII, no. CXX, 477; v. XXIX, nos. V, 
70, 86-89, 96.
84. About the castles, see Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 7993-8000, 8096-8099; Livre de 
la conqueste, § 547, 554; s. dragoumes, Χρονικῶν Μορέως Τοπωνυμικά – Τοπογραϕικά – 
Ἱστορικά, Athens 1921, 199-204; Bon, La Morée franque, 158-159, 414-7; andreWs, Castles 
of the Morea, 40-48; Venetians and Knights Hospitallers: Military Architecture Networks, 
76-79; molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, 228; BreuilloT, Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie 
Médiévale, 39-40, 179-89; longnon, L’Empire Latin du Constantinople, 262-263; n. d. 
konTogiannis, Settlements and countryside of Messenia during the late Middle Ages: the 
testimony of the fortifications, BMGS 34, 1 (2010), 15-16. The Aragonese version of the 
Chronicle dates the building of Old Navarino in the 1290s and claims that the brothers of 
the Teutonic order were responsible for its maintenance (Libro de los Fechos, §§ 470-1). For 
the “robberies” in harbour Tafel – Thomas, nos. CCCLXX [J]2, 8.
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The new Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II does not seem to have taken 
advantage of the troubles of the Angevins. Some persons seem nonetheless 
to have considered the Byzantine conquest of the whole Peninsula as an 
option. In 1288 Emperor Andronikos confirmed on request a property in 
Argolis, in a region which never returned to Byzantine control85. 
Notwithstanding the ambivalence of the central governments the war 
continued until 1289, when the Principality of Achaia acquired a new Prince, 
Florent of Hainaut, who had married the daughter of Prince Guillaume. Here 
again was a sovereign who could concentrate on the matters of Morea, and 
he made peace with Byzantium. At the same time there were negotiations 
about the marriage alliance between the heiress of the Latin Emperor and 
the son of Emperor Andronikos. In peace between the Principality of Achaia 
and Byzantium apparently both sides kept the territories they held. The 
peace lasted only seven years and was broken by armed conflicts86.
Demographic consequences 
The idea of the devastating effects of the war on the demography of 
Morea is mainly based on Sanudo’s story about a woman who lost seven 
husbands in war, on one quite rhetorical letter, and on the Chronicle of 
Morea. In addition, the transportations of food supplies from southern 
Italy, especially during 1269-1273, has been seen as an indication of famine 
and resulting depopulation87. 
85. f. dölger, Ein Chrysobull des kaisers Andronikos II. für Theodoros Nomikopulos 
aus dem Jahre 1288, OCP 21 (1955), 58-62. Dölger suggests that the document is evidence 
that the Byzantines had temporary control over the region where the property lay. This 
possibility cannot be denied, but there is no other information indicating a campaign in this 
region and/or period.
86. Livre de la conqueste, §§ 587-827; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8474-9335; Actes 
Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée, nos. V, VII, IX, XXVIII-XXIX, XLIV; I Registri della 
Cancelleria Angioina, v. XXXVIII, no. XXX, 376; a. e. laiou, Constantinople and the 
Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II. 1282­1328, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1972, 
39-41, 48-54.
87. Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 129; Livre de la conqueste, §§ 597-606; Το 
Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8475–8685; N. fesTa (ed.), Lettera inedita dell’ imperatore Michele 
VIII Paleologo al Pontefice Clemente IV, Bessarione 6 (1899), 46-47. Curiously the Ragusan 
document concerning the Moreote woman who gave herself in servitude due to hunger has 
been left unnoted in previous research about the effects of the war for the demography of 
Morea.
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Scholars who want to deny the significant effects of the war on the 
demography have refuted the significance of these claims, at least as 
indications of long lasting trends. The problems of narrative sources are 
well known, and there are also several documents concerning transportation 
of food supplies to the Principality in the 1290s, during a time of peace and, 
according to the Chronicle, of great prosperity. Even the self-sufficiency of 
Morea is questioned88. 
Modern demographic history considers that the effects of sudden 
catastrophes such as wars are short-lived. The survivors have more resources 
at their disposal and can have several children. The researchers who are 
skeptical about the devastating effects of the war believe that the demographic 
development of Morea corresponded to that of Eastern Macedonia, where 
the archives of Mount Athos provide plenty of information. Here the 
population seems to have been growing in the thirteenth century. In the 
early fourteenth century there were temporary problems and stagnation; 
the amount of children per family decreased. Probably this was due to wars 
and economic problems, but the real population decline took place only 
at the time of the Black Death, which kept coming back and thus held the 
population levels down for a long time89. 
Definitive answers are difficult to give. We do not know, for example, 
the relation of the grain shipments from South Italy to Romania to the 
real local need. The same applies to the 2000 gold ounces that king Charles 
ordered to be given for the Prince in 1269 for reparation of the war damages 
and/or for travel expenses90. The continuity, or resumption, of trade is, 
88. Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée, 16-17, nos. XLVIII, CXV, CLXVI, CXCIII-
CXCV; loCk, The Franks in the Aegean, 247-51; sakellariou, Latin Morea in the Late 
Middle Ages, 308–311.
89. sakellariou, Latin Morea in the Late Middle Ages, 304-8; panagioTopoulos, 
Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου, 27-44. About the demographic information 
from the archives of Mount Athos, see J. leforT, Population et peuplement en Macédoine 
orientale IXe–XVe siécle, in Hommes et richesses dans l’Empire byzantin, v. 2, VIIIe–XVe 
siècle [Réalités byzantines 3], eds. V. kravari – J. leforT – C. morrisson, Paris 1991, 69-82; 
A. laiou, The Agrarian Economy: Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries, in The Economic History 
of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century, editor-in-Chief a. laiou, 
Washington D. C. 2002, 316–317. For modern demographic theories see for example m. livi-
BaCCi, A Concise History of World Population, translated by C. ipsen, Malden 1997.
90. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana (1916), 32 (reg. v. 3, f. 3); I Registri della 
Cancelleria Angioina, v. II, no. VIII, 21; v. IV, no. XIV, 370; v. V, no. XVII, 32; Bon, La 
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however, proved, for example, by disputes over custom duties for raw silk 
brought from the Principality to South-Italy in 1277, by the grant from 
customs duties of Clarenza in the testament of Prince Guillaume, and by the 
“robberies” in the document of 127891.
Archaeological surveys indicate, that in late medieval times several 
smaller settlements were abandoned and the people concentrated on more 
defensible places such as fortified villages on elevated positions. When this 
process began, however, is more difficult to say92. One should also mention 
that several churches were built or decorated in Byzantine Morea during the 
war or immediately afterward. This could be a sign of prosperity. On the 
other hand it could also indicate that people in trouble sought divine help. 
Building a church seems to have been surprisingly cheap, and a list of donors 
for a small church in Mani built in 1265 indicates that the erection and 
decoration cost only 14 ½ hyperpyra. In addition, building projects could 
also have been used to strengthen the Orthodox and Byzantine identity93.
Morée franque, 139. For grain shipments and grain trade from south-Italy to Romania see 
especially dourou-eliopoulou, Η ανδεγαυική κυριαρχία στη Ρωμανία επί Καρόλου Α΄, 
143-151, 170-171, 182-184; a. Tzavara, Attività Economiche nelle città del Principato di 
Morea nel corso del XIII sec., Studi Veneziani 54 (2007), 226-231.
91. Cerone, La sovranità napoletana (1916), 252–256 (reg. v. 28, 13 t.; reg. v. 28, f. 
14); minieri-riCCio, Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò, 10 May 1277; I Registri della Cancelleria 
Angioina, v. XXIII, no. IC, 2; v. XXV, no. CIV, 5; v. XXIII, no. XCV, 48; hopf, Griechenland 
im Mittelalter, 317; Tzavara, Attività Economiche 222-6, 231-7. A. Tzavara’s Clarentza, 
une ville de la Morée latine XIIIe – Xve siècle, Venise 2008 has unfortunately not been on 
my disposal.
92. e. aThanassopoulos, Landscape Archeology of Medieval and Pre-Modern Greece: 
The Case of Nemea, in Aegean Strategies: Studies of Culture and Environment on the 
European Fringe, eds. p. kardulias, m. shuTes, Lanham Md. 1997, 88-94; panagioTopoulos, 
Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου, 45-49; A Rough and Rocky Place: Landscape 
and Settlement History of the Methana Peninsula, eds. Ch. mee – H. forBes, Liverpool 1997, 
94-99; 120-173 passim.; The Asea Valley Survey: An Arcadian Mountain Valley from the 
Palaeolithic Period until Modern times, eds. J. forsén – B. forsén, Stockholm 2003, 79-121 
passim., 317-321; m. h. Jameson, C. n. runnels – T. h. van andel, A Greek Countryside: The 
Southern Argolid from Prehistory to the Present Day, Stanford California 1994, 246-257; p. 
armsTrong, The Survey area in the Byzantine and Ottoman Periods, in Continuity and Change 
in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey, v. 1, Methodology and Interpretation, eds. 
W. Cavanaugh – J. CrouWel – r. CaTling – g. shipley, London 2002, 369-372, 390-402.
93. kalopissi-verTi, Dedicatory Inscriptions, 65-82; ead., The Impact of the Fourth 
Crusade on Monumental Painting, 83-84.
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What kind of damage could the war have caused? Medieval raids seem 
to have been often short in duration (only a couple of days, the major ones 
a week or two). If the raiding forces kept themselves together, they could 
cover only a small area; if they divided into smaller groups, they became less 
able to cope with resistance. The actual plundering seems to have been often 
carried out with patrols of about 10 men94. The reader might remember that 
the group from kalavryta in 1277 consisted of 13 men.
As it has been mentioned already, there were only a few major military 
actions after the initial phase of the war. The Byzantine raiders were probably 
small and fast-moving groups, trying to get as much booty as possible 
before the defenders could respond, for example the Frankish cavalry from 
their bases. Thus the distances covered were also probably small and the 
possibilities of light infantry, such as Slavs and Tsakones, to do damage were 
limited. Naval forces could operate at longer distances from their base areas, 
but if the men –while on shore–went inland, they risked being cut off from 
their ships. Then, of course, there were the cases of the unpaid troops of the 
Franks who plundered for a living.
There was probably no time for the attackers to destroy the crops 
completely during these short raids95. The raiders could plunder, but pillaging 
would have been more difficult. Most likely the cattle formed the main part 
of their booty. The population could probably seek shelter fairly well in the 
rough terrain and fortifications. 
As we have seen, the distribution of the settlements might have changed. 
In the area that was covered by the Laconia survey, the regions closest to 
Lakedaimon had suffered most depopulation. In my opinion this might have 
been partly result of war discussed in this article. There is also information 
that many Greeks from the Frankish-controlled area moved to Byzantine 
territory96. This also means that most of the people in the depopulated areas 
did not necessarily die, but may have moved away. 
94. For the conduct of raids in medieval times see for example marshall, Warfare in 
the Latin East, 183–209; ΚεΚαυμενος, Στρατηγικόν, εισαγωγὴ - μετάφραση – σχόλια D. 
Tsougkarakis, Athens 1996, § 9; syvänne, The Age of Hippotoxotai, 109-110, 289-290. 
95. v. hanson, Warfare and agriculture in classical Greece, Pisa 1983, 8-62, 146-147.
96. armsTrong, The Survey area in the Byzantine and Ottoman Periods, 347-350, 
361-372, 398-402; G. milleT (ed.), Inscriptions Byzantines de Mistra, BCH 23 (1899), 
111; Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 5598–5641; Livre de la conqueste, § 387; zakyThinos, Le
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Less attention has been given to the possibility that the concentration 
of population, if it began at this time, might have had a negative effect on 
population growth. Dispersed settlements facilitate intensive agriculture 
and greater surpluses. They are also less prone to epidemic diseases97. This 
could have been important when the Black Death struck. The acts of war 
did not destroy trade, but certainly increased the risks, and Sanudo had 
nostalgic memories of times when merchants could travel safely98.
Conclusions
The phase of war in Morea under discussion was mainly characterized 
by a stalemate. The Byzantines did not want to fight in the open field, and 
the Franks did not dare to venture into the mountains for fear of ambushes. 
When de Sumoroso apparently did so, he was indeed defeated. It is, however, 
notable that the Latins did not attack the strong but isolated castle of 
kalavryta in the north. Perhaps they were afraid to commit troops in a siege 
and leave the south open. In addition the general political situation, such as 
the union negotiations, might have discouraged major military campaigns.
The defense of the Byzantines was actually quite effective, and they 
were perhaps more successful at harassing the Latins than the other way 
around, although the nature of the sources may distort our image. Yet the 
Byzantines could gain new ground only if the Franks were committed 
elsewhere or suddenly found themselves in very disadvantageous situation, 
as had happened at Pelagonia and Berat. Apparently the men of the 
Principality had by now learned the ways of the Byzantines. At any rate, 
it is difficult to say at which point the Byzantines abandoned the attempt 
to conquer the whole Peninsula in the near future. The fortifications which 
Despotat Grec de Morée. v.2, Vie et Institutions, 205. For other cases during thirteenth-
fifteenth centuries when  the Greek peasants have escaped over the frontiers between of the 
Franks, Byzantines, and Venetians (mainly in order to avoid heavy taxation or enemy attacks) 
see d. JaCoBy, Peasant Mobility across the Venetian, Frankish and Byzantine Borders in 
Latin Romania, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries, in I Greci durante la Venetocrazia: Uomini, 
spazio, idée (XIII – XVIII sec.): Atti del convengno internazionale di studi, Venezia 3 – 7 
dicembre 2007, eds. Ch. malTezou – a. Tzavara – d. vlassi, Venezia 2009, 525-539).
97. Settlement pattern influencing the intensity of agriculture, see aThanassopoulos, 
Landscape Archeology of Medieval and Pre-Modern Greece, 86–87, 90–98. 
98. Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο, 105–107.
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the Byzantines evidently built probably also contributed to the stalemate. 
In my opinion the strongest candidates as Byzantine built-fortifications are 
Chelmos, Zarnata, and the city-walls of Mistra. The fortification buildings 
in Morea might be compared with the fortification project that Michael VIII 
undertook along the Sangarios river against the Turks, although this later 
project was naturally more important for the Empire99. If the basic purpose 
of fortifications is to discourage the enemy from even initiating the attack, 
the Byzantine efforts in Morea can be judged successful. In the 1280s the 
Latins, too, strengthened their defense with new fortifications.
There is little evidence that the Emperor held a significant army in 
Morea, and the relatively modest numbers of troops the Angevins sent to the 
Peninsula indicate that the numbers of troops on the imperial payrolls were 
small. Thus I consider it unjustified to claim that it was war in Morea that 
needlessly drained the resources from the defense of Anatolia100. One should 
also remember that the Angevin troops in Morea could have been used 
against the Byzantines in Albania, and the Principality would have been 
happy to contribute to attempts to re-conquer Constantinople101. Besides, 
keeping troops at readiness in frontier regions caused financial strains, and 
holding the men together for long times in one place made them vulnerable 
to diseases.
The defense of the Byzantine Morea probably relied to a great extent on 
the local inhabitants, from whom at least the Slavs had some kind of military 
obligations, but also autonomy. Moreover, one should not forget the role of 
the Latin corsairs102 from Monemvasia and elsewhere in the Empire, who 
99. For the fortifications along Sangarios see Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, 
VI.29; C. foss, Byzantine Malagina and the Lower Sangarius, Anatolian Studies 40 (1990), 
173–176.
100. Bartusis may have had in mind that the Byzantine army in Morea c. 1262-1264 
included men from the frontier region of Magedon, which at the same time fell victim to 
serious attacks by the Turks. The Byzantines could, however, stabilize the situation at this 
time (Παχυμέρης, Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι, III.16, 21). 
101. Earlier, Borsari has claimed that the troops sent to Morea diminished the number 
of men who could be sent against Constantinople (Borsari, La Politica bizantina di Carlo I 
d’Angiò, 334).
102. Papadopoulou estimates that judging from names � of the corsairs mentioned in 
the Venetian claims document of 1278 are Italians (papadopoulou, Πειρατές και κουρσάροι, 
98). Although some of the name forms are hard to identify, the figure is probably close to 
truth.
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could harass sea lanes and coasts. Modern research usually emphasizes that 
in Byzantium the imperial army was responsible for warfare103. Perhaps it 
was so in theory and during the major campaigns, but in low-level warfare 
the “private sector” formed by non-regular locals and corsairs might in 
practice carry the main burden.
Use of the “private sector” could be cheap, but the problem with such 
irregular groups was that their aims might differ from the goals of central 
government. Their main –or sole–concern was probably to get booty, 
regardless of the consequences: the attacks on Venetians, for instance, 
created trouble for the Empire; in fact, the Emperor had to compensate 
most of the “robberies” mentioned in the claims document of 1278, albeit 
several years later, and the sum was considerably smaller than the initial one 
requested by claimants. During the peace in the 1290s, the locals also caused 
conflicts with the Franks. The Greek inhabitants of the Frankish territories 
were probably the main victims of the Byzantine raids, and this may have 
begun to turn opinions against the Empire. It seems that the relationship 
between the Franks and the Greeks in Principality became closer as time 
went by and the Franks put more trust in the Greeks104.
Destroying the agricultural production base during the apparently 
small and short term incursions was difficult, and it is unlikely that the war 
caused substantial or long-term demographic decline in the Peninsula. Some 
areas might have lost people, but some areas gained, especially the Byzantine 
ones which seem to have benefitted from refugees. Constant military actions, 
however, were probably a strong motive for people to concentrate in easily
103. See for example BarTusis, The Late Byzantine Army, 213–214, 217–221, 307–311; 
T. kolBaBa, Fighting for Christianity: Holy War in the Byzantine Empire, Byz 68 (1998), 
209–211. 
104. For the reparations to the Venetians see I trattati con Bizanzio. 1265­1285, eds. 
M. pozza, G. ravegnani [Pacta Veneta 10], Venezia 1996, no. 10; morgan, The Venetian 
Claims Commission, 426-427; laiou, The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 57-66. About 
the conflicts in the 1290s, see Livre de la conqueste, §§ 662-830; Libro de los Fechos, §§ 
473-85. On the integration of the Franks and their Greek subjects, see for example d. JaCoBy, 
Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in Peloponnesus after the 
Fourth Crusade, AHR 78, 4 (1973), 892-903; BreuilloT, Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie 
Médiévale, 273-274.
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defendable settlements105. This could have hampered intensive agriculture 
and made the society more vulnerable to epidemic diseases. There does not 
seem to have been wide spread enslavement of prisoners. The prisoners whose 
fate we do know were evidently kept in chains for exchange and perhaps for 
ransom.
105. Sygkellou has reached similar conclusions concerning Epeiros in her study about 
wars and the consequences of wars in Late Medieval north-western Greece (sygkellou, Ο 
πόλεμος στον δυτικό ελλαδικό χώρο, 106-112, 126-148). 
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The ConfliCT BeTWeen The angevins and The ByzanTines in morea 
in 1267-1289: a laTe ByzanTine endemiC War
This article attempts to reconstruct a late Byzantine low-level war, 
namely the conflict in the Morea during 1267-1289, which took place 
between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the 
one side, and the Byzantines on the other side. This conflict offers a case 
of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Special 
attention is given to the economic and demographic consequences of war for 
Morea, for the building of fortresses, and to the idea put forward in previous 
research that the war in Morea needlessly took resources away from the 
defense of Anatolia – thus contributing to the loss of the area to the Turks.
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